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7
Practicing Practicing
Ladelle McWhorter

"There is something ludicrous in philosophical discourse," Michel Foucault
writes, "when it tries, from the outside, to dictate to others, to tell them
where their truth is and how to find it ... " (Foucault 1985, 9). In our age of
moral relativism and multiculturalism, it is easy to hear in this sentence a
simple condemnation of intellectuals who pose as authorities on questions
of belief, and it is all too easy to agree; yes, of course, we ought not tell other
people what to think. But given the issues, directions, and investments of
Foucault's work, especially in The Use ofPleasure where this passage is to be
found, I think this sort of soft relativistic reading of him is a great oversimplification, if not a total error. As I see it, Foucault's statement is not so much
a disparagement of authority and authoritative pronouncement as it is a
gesture toward a philosophical reorientation; Foucault is developing analternative conception of what philosophical work might be. Within this reorienting movement, authority ceases to be of very much concern, not because one comes to the realization that there are no authorities (there may
well be) but because one ceases to be primarily concerned with pronouncement; that is, the formulation of true propositions is no longer one's primary philosophical goal. And once one ceases to focus one's energy onestablishing the truth of propositions, one is no longer likely to spend much
time dictating to others which propositions they should hold true.
In his last years Foucault became very interested in the Hellenistic period,
a time when philosophy was less concerned with doctrine and more concerned with developing, as Pierre Hadot has put it, "a way of life." Hadot,
whose work was extremely important to Foucault, 1 offers Stoicism as an example of this widespread Hellenistic view: "The Stoics, for instance, declared
explicitly that philosophy, for them, was an 'exercise.' In their view, philosophy did not consist in teaching an abstract theory-much less in the exegesis of texts-but rather in the art of living. It is a concrete attitude and a
determinate lifestyle, which engages the whole of existence. The philosophical act is not situated merely on the cognitive level, but on that of the
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self and of being. It is a progress which causes us to be more fully, and makes
us better" (Hadot 1995, 82-83).2 To illustrate this point, Hadot cites Seneca
("Philosophy teaches us how to act, not how to talk"), Epictetus ("spiritual
progress does not consist in learning to explain Chrysippus better, but in
transforming one's own freedom"; "the subject-matter of the art of living
[i.e., philosophy] is the life of every individual"), and Plutarch ("since philosophy is the art of living, it should not be kept apart from any pastime")
(1995, no; notes 9, 10, and n).It is from these texts and others from the Hellenistic period that Foucault takes his notion that lives can be works of art
and that philosophical practice can be part of an ethos, a way of living.
Like Foucault, although without benefit ofHadot's work until recently,
I have come increasingly over the years to view and to experience philosophy as a kind of self-forming activity. The point of philosophical endeavor
is not to establish a body of cosmological or moral propositions that we
might believe in or adhere to and that we might reasonably expect others
to believe in or adhere to as well. Philosophy is not pursuit of truth. Philosophy is pursuit of wisdom. Truth, as Agent Mulder often claims, may
well be out there, awaiting us like an as yet unidentified object just over the
horizon. But wisdom's residence is never out there; if wisdom comes into
view at all, its site of emergence will be here-with, through, and as the unfolding of my life, or your life, or the life of someone else. Whereas truth
may occur as the timeless relationship between a proposition and a state
of affairs, wisdom occurs as the temporal unfolding of human thought in
practice. This is what Hellenistic philosophers such as the Stoics and Epicureans and Cynics seem to have believed. This is what I think Foucault
came to believe. At any rate, it is what I believe.
But, if I am to be a philosopher, this presents me with a problem. The
principal activity of philosophers in our time is the production of essays,
like the one I am writing now. And essays-as fostered, encouraged, or even
demanded by academic institutions-are usually construed as tools of transmission, a kind of intellectual transportation; essays are the vehicles in which
our truths ride from one mind to another. Thus, philosophical practice in
the present day is reduced to truth-acquisition followed by report-writing.
The process by which one acquires the truths to be inserted into the vehicle is not at issue (unless one is accused of plagiarism); the point is to get
into possession of some truths and to construct a vehicle adequate to bear
them to their destination, "the audience." But what does any of that have
to do with cultivating oneself as a site for the emergence of wisdom?
I'm not terribly sure. So the temptation, which I'm certain is not peculiar to me, is to set that question aside and just get on with the business of
constructing intellectual vehicles for the small stock of ideas that one has
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already managed to amass, 3 or to undertake a frantic search for a new idea,
a new truth that can be manufactured, packaged, and launched into the
world by the editor's deadline, without regard to what effect that frantic
process might have on the writer. It is very easy to succumb to this temptation without even realizing it, especially when living at the hectic pace
that most of us maintain during the academic year. I have to admit that it
is exactly what I did when I started working on this essay.
From the beginning of the project, I knew what I wanted to write about:
the differences between feminist practices of woman-affirmation and Foucauldian care of the self, which might be construed as practices of selfaffirmation. I wanted to say that even for someone who is a woman and
comfortably identifies that way, woman-affirming practices may be positively antithetical to caring for one's self. (This is because feminist practices of woman-affirmation often make assumptions about the nature of
selfhood that I believe are both mistaken and dangerous, especially for people who are oppressed. Foucault's conception of selfhood and descriptions
of self-cultivating practices are less likely to support patterns of oppression
that currently exist. But more about this later.) I also had what I thought
were some pretty good ideas about how to illustrate those differences. Nevertheless, I seemed unable to settle into a consistent tone or style of writing, no matter how hard I worked at it. The essay just never sounded right
to my ear.
At first it seemed that my problem was that I didn't know who I was writing for. Who was my audience for this explanatory exercise? Was it feminists
interested in but not knowledgeable about Foucault, feminists hostile to Foucault, feminists already convinced by Foucault, nonfeminist Foucauldians?
Who? How I styled the essay depended on which of these groups I wanted
my message to reach. After all, essays are means of transmission. How I built
my verbal vehicle depended on which audience I wanted my little truth transported to. But after weeks of struggle over the question of audience identity,
I finally recognized that my problem was not in fact the lack of a clear sense
of audience to which to present my thesis; it was the pernicious presence of
a need to designate an audience for what supposedly was a philosophical exercise of self-transformation. I was focused on others when I should have
been focused on myself. Furthermore, I had to ask myself, why did I want to
explore the differences between feminist woman-affirming practices and
Foucauldian care of the self? So that I could tell those feminists what they
were doing wrong? So that I could enlighten some Foucault scholars about
feminist practice? So that I could presume to tell those other people what to
think? What would be the value in that, in relation to wisdom, even if I were
in possession of some extraordinary truth? I began to worry that I didn't
145
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have a message after all. No message, no audience. Ultimately that seemed to
equal no essay.
But, I realized, what I did have was a very real (in fact a fast-growing) concern. Something was gnawing at me. And that was a place to start. For the
sake of the essay, if for no other reason, I needed to pay close attention to
the nature and context of my own concern; I needed to take care of my self.
So I started all over again. The important thing to focus on, I decided,
was the tension I feel between feminist practices of woman-affirmation and
practices associated with a Foucauldian conception of care of the self. I'm
attracted to practices of woman-affirmation, especially to those that involve revaluation of natural cycles, carnality, and the earth. Something important offers itself in those movements, and yet I feel that they endanger
me in ways that Foucault's work warns me about and makes me sensitive
to. I decided that if I paid attention to the uneasiness I feel when I try to
situate myself in relation to both of these discursive practices simultaneously (which was the theme of the anthology, anyway, right?), maybe something unforeseen would happen. Who knows? Maybe I could even find a
way to practice philosophy while still fulfilling the requirements of my academic job. Imagine that! So I turned my attention to feminist practices
that have spoken niost meaningfully to me over the last twenty-five years,
namely, those that involve how I live with, through, and as my body.
Feminists nowadays write a lot about "the body," thereby acknowledging the importance of corporeal issues in our intellectual pursuits, but we
don't often acknowledge straightforwardly how difficult it was to live life
as a female body before our encounters with early radical feminist reinterpretations of female bodily existence. Simone de Beauvoir's inventory of
masculine supremacist invective against female bodies in The Second Sex
accurately portrays what many of us lived with-ubiquitous images of our
bodies (which were already ourselves) as obtrusive, ugly, filthy, stinking, irrational, and inherendy diseased. Beauvoir herself suggests that this construction of the female body is historical and therefore optional. The radical feminists of the late 1960s and early 1970s took her suggestion very
seriously and began to critique the construct of femininity that produced
and reinforced such degraded bodily existences. Alice Embree's analysis of
Madison Avenue strategies to create and sustain feminine consumers and
Naomi Weisstein's critique of contemporary psychological theories, both
of which appeared in the 1970 publication Sisterhood Is Powerful, are cases
in point, and they are only two of scores of articles that appeared around
the same time. 4 Women believed we were stinking and filthy because profitmakers told us so through every medium available. We believed we were
irrational and incompetent because professionals told us through every so146
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cial institution in existence. Feminists told and showed us, however, that
these messages were motivated politically and economically. They were not
truths to be accepted despite humiliation and pain; they were propaganda
to be resisted and opposed.
Feminist exposes and reinterpretations made it possible to imagine a culture in which female bodies would be celebrated and valued rather than
denigrated, because they made it possible to believe that the denigration of
our female bodies in this culture was a political rather than a biological fact,
a matter of power arrangements rather than nature. As I read the words of
feminist anthropologists, historians, poets, cultural critics, theologians, and
others, I began to look at my body differently, to see potentials not seen before, and to feel different inside (and as) my skin. The practice of reading,
discussing what I read with friends, and seeking out more feminist writings
to read, was positively life-transforming for me and for many other women
my age and older. It helped me realize that the body my culture had handed
me was not the only one I might have and that with time and effort my corporeal existence could be otherwise, even radically otherwise.
This move toward the otherwise was no mere intellectual leap, no simple rational rejection of a false ideology soon replaced by the truth. This
transformation was not something that took place just inside my head.
Feminist writing that critiqued and reinterpreted bodily existence invited
me and summoned me to conduct myself, as a bodily being, differently. As
I saw new conceptual possibilities, I enacted new behavioral possibilities
and then saw new conceptual possibilities in turn. Not just my thinking,
but my whole compartmental ensemble changed.
And it didn't stop there. Through the 1980s feminists made connections
between the denigration of female bodies that is still rife in our culture and
the misuse and abuse of other beings. It became clear that our culture's disgust with and exploitation of female bodies is just one part of a much larger
picture that includes refusal of human mortality and denial of our dependence upon nature. Along with writers such as Susan Griffin, Vandana
Shiva, Ynestra King, and Starhawk, I too found that as my ways of thinking
about and of being a female body began to shift away from the dualistic,
quasi-Cartesian, masculine supremacist ways I had thought and lived before, I needed and wanted to develop and engage in new practices regarding aging, mortality, and ecological cycles. I couldn't just be a feminist. I had
to be something like an eco-feminist. And this shift involved much more
than just adoption of a new set of doctrines; it involved-it primarily consisted of-the practice of a new set of actions. I didn't just read Starhawk;
I gardened and com posted and contributed money to environmental lobby
groups and educated myself about environmental issues and policies and
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drove a pick-up route for a recycling co-op. And I saw these things as directly and intimately related to my feminist practices. Once again, I was rethinking bodily existence-with and through my body.
Maybe that was how I started rethinking philosophy as a way oflife. I'm
not sure, but it was during that same period of time that I came to be consciously open to the import of Plutarch's words: "since philosophy is the
art of living, it should not be kept apart from any pastime." It was about
this time in my life that I became deeply aware of the need to think of philosophy not as mere intellectual exercise, as a mind/body dualist might have
it, but as physical, material practice. With my changing, materially, ecologically thoughtful comportment, I was becoming a living critique of (albeit still a site of ongoing struggle with) Western metaphysical dualism. If
one of the major philosophical issues of the twentieth century was the attempt to dismantle and move beyond metaphysics in general and dualism
in particular, then I was twentieth-century Western philosophy incarnate.
I think many of us feminists, particularly eco-feminists, were.
Throughout that long period in my life, then, feminist practices were very
important for me. They focused and helped me focus on overcoming traditional-crippling-conceptions of female bodies and restructuring my
bodily comportment; in doing so they helped me connect myself in new
and positive ways with the other living beings and systems on our living
planet; and all of this involved extensive engagement with other feminists
in bodily practices such that I could not forget that even the seemingly most
otherworldly, most abstract of intellectual pursuits is truly corporeal, material, and dependent upon the organic interconnections that make up our
earth. Over the past twenty years, feminist practices have made me who I
am; they have given me my self. And it is a much better, healthier, more beautiful self than it would have been had feminism never come to exist. Yet I
am deeply suspicious of many feminist woman-affirming practices, even
while I am so attracted (and so indebted) to them. My suspicions are painful
to me; I want to avoid them. But as a philosopher, I find I just can't.
The effort to rid ourselves of the oppressive bodily comportments and
self-images that patriarchal society constructed for us was in many respects
a necessarily creative enterprise. In the process of rejecting that femininity, we had to imagine and build new ways to act, to see ourselves, and to
relate to others and the world around us. We had to become other than
what we had been; we had to invent ourselves. Had we just done that-had
we just opened ourselves to possibility and experimentation-who knows
what might have happened? What would women have become if we had
simply dismantled 196os-style femininity and female sex roles and embraced the unknown? But we didn't. Historian Alice Echols says that by
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1975-and in some groups such as Boston's Cell16 as early as 1970-radical feminism was in decline and was being replaced on the narrowly defined political front by liberal feminism and on every other front by cultural feminism. 5 For a variety of reasons, some of the same feminists who
had been trying to destroy static images of femaleness began trying to construct an alternative image-an image they claimed did what the patriarchal images had failed to do: It captured the truth of womanhood.
Since that door began to open just before 1970-that door that was an
exit from a patriarchically constructed female essence-feminists have agonized over the question of the truth of womanhood. Radical feminism's
own analyses seemed to point to an absence of such a truth outside patriarchy (as well as, of course, an absence of actual truth within it). But if absence there were, then to step through that door would be to step out of
womanhood altogether and, hence, to run the risk of scattering, of becoming so other that unity would be impossible and newfound feminist
solidarity and support would be jeopardized and quite possibly lost. If feminism as an organized movement was to continue to exist, the door could
not be merely an exit. It had to be a portal to something real and substantial enough to hold together, to hold us together, and to give us something
to affirm.
This concern about the loss of unity and the belief it gave rise to-that
there is a nonpatriarchal truth of womanhood-was subterranean in some
of the work of the early cultural feminist and eco-feminist movements. And
so it was possible, especially for those of us who still desperately needed
the communities and practices that would help us resist the ever-evolving
patriarchal images of femaleness that assailed and pervaded us, to ignore
the danger that such a belief entails. We needed a community and a language to support our own creative ventures, so we were willing to overlook
the denial of creativity that was taking the form of cries of discovery.
But it was a denial of creativity. As an illustration, consider the contributions of Judy Grahn. Like all good feminist work, Grahn's scholarly activity was not merely cognitive; it was a corporeal practice intended to
change her own ways of living as a female body, and was offered to her readers as an aid in our own woman-affirming practices. In "From Sacred Blood
to the Curse and Beyond," Grahn explores the importance of menstruation for the prehistory of human society, a task she undertakes in part as a
way to come to terms with her own femaleness and female bodily functions. Since there is hardly any aspect of female embodiment that is more
stigmatized in our culture than menstruation, as Beauvoir among others
points out (Beauvoir 1989, especially 149-50), Grahn's choice of subject
matter is extremely apt. Male commentators on the subject have typically
149
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found it to be filthy and disgusting. In the not-so-distant past, women's
descriptions were filled with comments resembling those typical masculine judgments. Most girls-myself included-were taught to be ashamed
of the function, to view it as compromising their standing as rational creatures and competent citizens, and to hide it at least from males if not from
everyone.6 No more than a generation or two ago, women regularly referred
to it as "the curse." But far from being a painful curse, Grahn argues, menstruation was originally the very wellspring of culture. It was because of
menstruation that human beings "saw and learned to capture the concept
of time" (Grahn 1982, 268). Further, "[b]y carving the moon cycles onto
bone, by putting counting sticks into a basket, by tying knots in string, and
by stringing beads in a particular manner to account for their own periods
and the moon's, women created counting-and accounting" (Grahn 1982,
268). She continues: "Without menstruation and the sciences of measurement women developed from watching first the moon and then the stars,
there would be no clocks or watches, no astronomers, no mathematicians
or physicists, no astronauts, none of the architecture and engineering which
have been born from exact measurement and proportion. We could build
a nest, like a bird, but not a pyramid, not a square or rectangle or round or
any other regular geometric shape. Geometry was a gift of menstruation"
(Grahn 1982, 269). Indeed, Grahn implies, without this now degraded and
hidden mammalian function, we would hardly be human at all.
The thrust of Grahn's essay is not just that we need to find new ways to
live and to value ourselves but that we need to recover the lost value of menstruation as a way of recovering the true value of womanhood. By doing
that, we will discover ways to live menstruation (and our lives as women)
differently. Grahn relates in some detail the new knowledge of her own
body that she acquired and the practices that she engaged in after she began
to learn about the ancient meaning and importance of menstruation. The
process oflearning about that prehistorical world where women's bodies
were valued was life-transforming for her, as for other women she knows,
and she hopes it will be life-transforming for her readers. She offers her
scholarship as material for woman-affirming educational practices and
suggests that women follow her lead in developing feminist rituals that celebrate womanhood by celebrating menstruation.
Kay Turner, who has studied feminist rituals (including rites of passage
like the ones Grahn mentions), maintains, "Feminist ritual offers an imagistic revitalization for women and participation in the concrete, bodily expressive creation of new images of the feminine ... " (Turner 1982,220 ). Not
just menstruation rituals but also cleansing rituals, equinox rituals, dreamsharing rituals, bonding rituals, and so on are important means, Turner ar150
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gues, of"connect[ing] the individual with the group-dramatically, indissolubly" (Turner 1982, 226). Rituals are practices that produce a sense of
group identity and cohesiveness. But they are just as important for the health
of individuals as they are for the health of the groups to which those individuals belong. Through ritual, according to Turner, "A lost self is recovered, nurtured and allowed to emerge fully named" (Turner 1982, 231).
Grahn and Turner both assume that part of what happens in feminist
consciousness-raising, feminist scholarship, and feminist ritual-in all practices that are woman-affirming-is that women find their true identities,
their true selves. Woman-affirmation involves not so much self-creation or
self-formation as the recovery of a self that is already formed. This recovery, or uncovering, can happen, they maintain, because through feminist
activity women open spaces outside of patriarchal power, beyond the reach
of the networks of power that define femaleness as inferior to maleness and
impose hardship and shame upon women. This is why Turner asserts that
feminist ritual in particular is a form of radical politics (Turner 1982, 222).
Grahn and Turner and their compatriots such as Kathleen Barry and
Mary Daly might be viewed as extreme essentialists quite unlike a good
many of their contemporaries and certainly unlike the anti-essentialist
postmodern feminists of the turn of this century.? But I don't think we can
dismiss them that easily. The turn away from radical creativity and toward
discovery that we see full scale in their work haunts all of feminism, I think,
including postmodern theory. And I fear it will continue to haunt us as
long as feminists yearn to affirm ourselves as an "us," as members of an
identifiable class of people called "women."
Yet what else are we to do? What is feminism about if it is not about people identifiable as women? What is it, if it is not a way of discovering commonalities and gathering women together to achieve certain goals? If we
embrace the unknown and experiment with creating forms of existence
beyond the category of womanhood, in what sense is what we are doing
"feminism" anymore?
At this point I become extremely uneasy. What initially attracted me to
feminism was its emphasis on moving beyond the present and the pastincluding any kind of mythical past. The old Women's Liberation Movement seemed to me to be about changing rules, loosening restrictions,
opening doors, challenging traditions, and experimenting with personal
styles and interpersonal relationships. It was a vigorous push outward, a
breaking of bonds, a headlong rush out of confinement and into the world.
It was not an inward-turning thing. It was leonine-ferociously destructive-and childlike-playful and creative. But of course, at the same time,
it was also a product of its culture, a culture that resists with all its might
151
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any turn away from the stasis of traditional identity, any move into the unknown. Somehow that culturally pervasive resistance overcame iconoclastic feminist momentum. Feminism gradually began to have an identifiable
center: Woman-woman the victim of oppression, woman the subject and
object of efforts to emancipate, woman the site of downtrodden virtue and
righteous social change. Feminism came to be about recognizing that
Woman and nurturing her as she recovered herself and took her destined
place as the catalyst for a general, culturewide moral revolution. What had
perhaps started out as a courageous journey into the unknown somehow
got recast as a kind of enlightened return to origins. What I fear is that
within feminism, such a turn is in some sense inevitable.
I sincerely hope not, for I feel endangered in the movement of that return. In spite of all I may have gained through woman-affirming practices,
I fear that in this re-centering movement I am being pulled back toward a
way of thinking and living that I wanted to interrupt and re-form, back
into a way of experiencing selfhood (and the world) that places stability
over becoming and change, into a way of thinking that places knowledge
over openness toward otherness and difference, toward that which eludes
categorization. And this feeling doesn't dissipate completely when I read
or work with anti-essentialist feminists. Underneath or alongside their
ubiquitous critiques of essentialism I still detect a hint of the assumption
that, despite it all and whatever happens, we are still women, and we can
rest assured that nothing in feminism will compromise that.
Through personal experience and through my study of Foucault's work,
I am deeply aware of how dis-affirming such assumptions and insistences
ultimately are for the kind of self that I am. And that brings me to Foucault
and self- (as opposed to woman-) affirming practices.
It has often been asserted that Foucault's early and middle works embody attempts to analyze political and social forces in the absence of subjectivity, which would seem to mean that any kind of self-affirmative gesture is impossible for Foucault. The first part of that assertion is true;
Foucault did in fact say once in an interview that he wanted to develop a
mode of analysis that did not rely upon a subject outside of history. 8 But
he never maintained that there is no such thing, at any given point in history, as human subjectivity of one sort or another. In Foucault's view,
whether there is or is not some form of subjectivity at a given place and
time is an empirical matter. In the periods Foucault studied, there were various kinds of subjectivity. In fact, it is these variations, together with the
possibility of variation itself, that Foucault is most concerned with through
much of his career. 9 Foucault merely refuses to assume that subjectivity,
selfhood, is foundational or ahistorical. Selves are historical creations, con152
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stituted within networks of power/knowledge relations; different networks
of power/knowledge yield different types of self. Self-affirmation, then, is
perfectly possible, but what sorts of practices are self-affirming depends
upon what type of self one is.
Foucault gives the name "normalization" to the power/knowledge network that he believes is most prevalent in our society today. The selves that
emerge within that network, various though they may be, are all normalized selves. This does not mean that all selves are normal-far from it!or that all selves not deemed normal are constantly being subjected to treatments to make them normal. In the most general terms, what it does mean
is, simply, that who one is can be fully characterized (insofar as it can be
characterized at all) in terms of norms and deviations from norms. In other
words, in every aspect of my being-physical, intellectual, moral, you name
it-I am a being in process, proceeding through stages of existence and
functions of daily life at a rate and along a vector that can be measured and
plotted against a norm. My individuality, insofar as it can be an object of
knowledge (mine or others'), just amounts to the totality of my deviations
from established norms.
Normalization is what Foucault at an early stage in his career might have
called a grid of intelligibility. It is a conceptual framework through which
we view ourselves and others (both human others and nonhuman beings
such as animals, plants, ecosystems, and human cultures). Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Foucault tells us, we Westerners have learned
to see all the world in terms of the category of development; all things develop, and their more or less natural patterns and forces of development can
be studied, normed, and to a great extent harnessed and directed by scientific means. This way of seeing has institutionalized itself in disciplines such
as psychology, criminology, sexology, biology, anthropology, pedagogy, and
many other fields; as it has done so, it has permeated and to some extent reshaped the institutional settings where those disciplines are practiced:
schools, hospitals, prisons, corporations, mental institutions, and social welfare bureaus. Thus, it is not simply a grid of intelligibility, a network of
knowledge; it is also a network of institutional practices, public policies, and
in general the routine exercise of social and political power. It is a network
of power/knowledge.
On first hearing, many readers simply reject the idea that who an individual is can be characterized and known entirely within the terms of normalization. But in fact it is extremely hard to give any information about
any person at all-oneself included-without referring to sets of norms.
There is hardly any intelligible way to talk about our bodies without referring to norms; how tall a person is, how fit, how healthy-virtually any as153
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sertion you can make will refer to functional norms and established patterns of human physiological development and decline. Further, most of us
reflect upon and present our personal histories in terms of developmental
norms. We employ the language of developmental psychology to account
for our behavior, our feelings, our inclinations, our talents, and our preferences in terms of developmental norms together with influences on our development that may have produced deviations from norms. In truth, most
of us are quite comfortable with self-descriptions that rely upon established
norms as reference points and may even feel slighted if our specific deviations go unrecognized. We know and experience ourselves as normalized
selves. And this is understandable, because within the power/knowledge
networks that shape our social world, the only kind of self that is intelligible at all is a normalized self. There is no outside to normalization, Foucault
says, meaning that normalizing power/knowledge networks are so pervasive that beyond them nothing is knowable.
Many of Foucault's readers take these conclusions as cause for despair,
for two reasons. First, if Foucault is right, our identities are all reifications
of norms and/or deviations from norms and, as such, tie us to networks of
power that use those norms to exploit and oppress us, as Foucault makes
clear in detail. This is especially obvious with identities such as "the delinquent," "the homosexual," or "the at-risk schoolchild," but even the apparently natural category "woman" is an identity founded upon a set of developmental norms stretching from fetal sex differentiation through
childhood gender acquisition through adolescent self-image formation. 10
To be a woman is to have passed through numerous stages of normed development and hence to display the physical and psychic marks of that developmental process. To bear the identity "woman" is thus to be available
to the institutions and disciplines that seek to direct and manage our developmental trajectories. A second reason many readers despair is that Foucault seems to be telling us that, since we are normalized selves through and
through with no residual essence, to attempt to dismantle the power/knowledge networks that hold us in bondage in oppressive institutions and practices is self-defeating; dismantling normalization would amount to dismantling our own conditions of possibility. What, then, is to be done? Aren't
all our avenues for taking control of our lives and resisting oppressive institutions effectively blocked? How can we possibly care for ourselves under
these circumstances?
Foucault certainly does not minimize the dangers that we face. Anything
we do will be risky. We cannot withdraw from a corrupt society into the apolitical security of ahistorical identities; that is an illusion, as separatist movements of the 1970s demonstrated. By the same token, we cannot simply set
154
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our historically produced identities aside, for we are the developmentally
emergent beings that society takes us to be. We cannot attack the very basis
upon which our being is constituted and expect to be unshaken in the process. We risk ourselves, in our very being, no matter what we decide to do.
Foucault, then, speaks of ubiquitous danger. Yet his analysis does not
make me feel endangered in the way that feminist woman-affirming practices do. I am much less frightened by Foucault's harsh picture of the current world than by Judy Grahn's or Kathleen Barry's optimistic exhortations to celebrate the recovery of a world and of selves we've supposedly
lost. I don't recognize myself in their idyllic portrait of prehistorical womanhood, or any other portrait of womanhood for that matter. I don't feel
comfortable figuring positive changes in my self-understanding and material comportment as a return to a reality obscured or lost. I can only think
that positing a true or original womanhood to which we might return (to
which we ought to be faithful?) will ultimately lead to (or at least play into)
a defensive conservatism that fears creativity, difference, and change. Creative movements, differings, openness toward unmastered becoming will
be suppressed, and those who embody and enact such movements will be
oppressed within the same discourses and institutions that once held so
much promise for freeing them. Within the terms of Foucault's analysis of
normalization, however, I do recognize myself. I recognize myself as a self
who, as "essentially" developmental, is "essentially" a phenomenon of becoming rather than of being. I recognize myself as a self who will always surpass what I have been, who will never be identical with myself from moment to moment. I recognize myself as a being who will always exceed the
boundaries of any identity. If I can find ways to affirm and care for that self,
that developmental self who "by nature" defies final categorization, I can
resist the oppressive aspects of normalizing networks of power (without
positing a place beyond normalization). Normalization gives us ourselves
as perpetually developing. Technologies of normalization then attempt to
control the direction and rate of that developmental energy. We cannot defy
normalization insofar as it gives us ourselves entirely, but we can resist and
gradually perhaps dismantle normalizing technologies and disciplines. We
can affirm ourselves as developing beings, ever-changing beings, while at
the same time adopting disciplinary practices-techniques of caring for
ourselves-that affirm the movement of our own becoming at the expense
of predetermined vectors and norms. In other words, we can affirm our developmental freedom without affirming the existing technologies that would
harness that self-differing energy. And then perhaps perpetual self-differing
will become self-overcoming and will allow something new to emerge beyond oppressive normalization.
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A primary danger that Foucault sees is the almost irresistible temptation to affirm not my self as developmental becoming but my identity as
some reified stage of that developmental process. The danger is that we will
refuse our selves in our movements of becoming by embracing static identities. When feminists call upon me to affirm my identity as a woman, beneath this joyful affirmation of carnal and specifically sexual existence I
also hear a demand that I abandon my developmental self, call a halt to becoming other, deny my potential for change and hence for self-formation,
and thus abandon both the care of myself and the practice of philosophy.
What, by contrast, do I hear Foucault calling me to do? To affirm myself
as a process of becoming, of becoming always other to what I have been,
to find and cultivate practices that will militate against reification and thus
place in question any identity's claim to timelessness. To take care of myself, in Foucauldian terms, is to foster an awareness of becoming, of otherness, to hold myself open to an open future, to give myself over to what
is not and cannot yet be known. 11 This, for a developmental self, is selfaffirmation; it requires the perpetual overcoming of identificatory categories. Care of the self, therefore, stands opposed to practices that affirm
my identity as a woman. Practices of woman-affirmation stand opposed
to affirmation of the free play of becoming, differing, and otherness.
This brings me, rather abruptly, into the full scope of the terrible tension I feel when I try to situate myself in relation to my philosophical work
and my feminist work simultaneously. If philosophy is a lifelong activity
of self-formation, which implies that the self is not a static entity awaiting
recovery, can I be both a philosopher and a feminist?
I don't know. I want to say yes, because I know the creative power of the
feminist practices that over the last twenty-five years produced me. But in
all honesty, I'm not sure. That the way to an answer involves resolute living through the tension, though, I have no doubt. It is through attempts at
philosophical, ethical practice of feminism that an answer will constitute
itself for each of us.
This much is clear to me: If I am to continue to be a feminist, I have to
find ways to rethink, but even more importantly to re-create, materially and
bodily, both the concept and the experience of womanhood. One way to do
that might be to learn to think woman not as a category of human being,
not as an identity, but as the name for a locus of creative formation. 12 This
would require first of all engagement in practices that would destabilize the
category. If this were his project, Foucault would engage in genealogical
scholarship, which is also an option for me. Reading (and teaching) the
works of scholars who have produced partial genealogies of certain aspects
of womanhood would surely be helpful-works like Elizabeth Badinter's
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Mother Love and Thomas Laqueur's Making Sex come to mind. I might also
focus my attention on womanhood as a visual phenomenon and try to
destabilize categorical thinking by challenging visual expectations. I can
place myself in situations where my visual images of womanhood are disrupted. These can be queer places-like bars that cater to mixed sex and
transgender groups-or they can be all-female places-like gym locker
rooms. In the former kind of place, obviously, it's hard to tell who is female
(whatever that starts out meaning) and who is not, and after awhile I find I
get numbed to the question and just put it aside. In the latter kind of place,
femaleness ceases to be a distinguishing feature of anybody, so the huge variety of what gets called female embodiment and comportment comes into
full view. 13 Maybe if the category woman is sufficiently destabilized and decentered, I could start working on ways to think woman as something other
than a category, something more like a site of volatility. Affirmations of
womanhood could then become not affirmations of a static presence or
truth but rather affirmations of something precisely not fully present and
not fully envisioned. 14
I have to acknowledge that for all its postmodern rhetorical correctness,
I'm a little wary of this path-not the practices of category destabilization,
which I engage in regularly, but the redefinition of womanhood beyond categorization. 15 Although I believe such a thing is logically possible and even
over time almost inevitable, such "solutions" offered hastily never sound
like much more than some kind of verbal trick-like I could rectify all sorts
of sexual injustices by just defining women as we know them/us out of existence. If women didn't exist, all kinds of important political issues (abortion, job discrimination, rape) wouldn't exist either. But those issues do
exist, and no mere verbal contortion is going to set them aside. Although I
see the philosophical value of this approach and I know its goal is the very
opposite of the kind of loss I fear, I still worry that without a lot of careful
work it could reduce my feminist practice to some kind of esoteric exercise
in theory production, to something that won't have much impact on most
people's lives, including my own. And what's the point of that? After all, if
feminism is important at all, it is because it is first of all about securing justice, recognition, protection, and material well-being for people who currently fit rather static definitions of femaleness taken as a natural kind. 16 To
do nothing more than just redefine feminism so as to leave out that kind of
tough work is to skirt the most important issues. So one important question I have to ask is: Is it possible to engage in that more traditional kind of
feminist political practice (the nitty-gritty equal rights and equal protections kind) while embracing a de-categorized conception of woman as a
locus of becoming?
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Although such engagement would require reorientation in our political
thinking and extensive reworking of our liberal rhetoric, I believe it is possible. I think I can embrace the idea that "woman" (whatever else it may be)
is the name for an important site for the emergence of a future and argue
effectively that those whose lives unfold at such sites must be protected,
physically and legally, and their free becoming fostered. What is important
is not the preservation of whatever "woman" is, 17 but the openness to the
becoming that occurs as what woman is overcomes itself and surpasses itself toward an open future. I think political action could be grounded in
something no more doctrinal and definite than that. I think I could do significant political work on the strength of a belief in the importance of resisting governmental, legal, economic, and cultural foreclosure of creative
possibility. That path might be a very hard one to negotiate, but that is no
reason to avoid taking it.
Furthermore, some of the resources for developing such political strategies already exist in some of the feminist practices I've already encountered
and cultivated for many years. When I (along with so many other feminists
in the 198os) was rethinking female bodies, was I not by so doing actually
creating a new body for myself, a body that I now inhabit and enact? I think
so, even if I and the feminists around me did not always recognize or acknowledge the creative dimensions of what we were doing. And when we
challenged masculine supremacy and authority, did we do so always in the
name of some older truth that had a prior claim? I don't think so; I think
we often did so in the name of difference and futurity rather than in the Ianguage of return. Sometimes we made assertions; we made truth-claims, and
truth -claims almost always at least implicitly ally themselves with timelessness, sameness, a present that does not change. But no matter what assertions we might have made, insofar as our feminism was embodied in practices rather than in doctrines and propositions, it allied itself with history,
contingency, and difference. Even Judy Grahn's practices affirm difference
and change, despite the fact that the conclusions she draws from them deny
contingency. We, I, need to acknowledge that implicit alliance between history, difference, and practice and make it explicit in all our political acts.
Still, it remains to be seen whether the work we would undertake once
these transformations had occurred would constitute something we would
want to call "feminist." That work would certainly have feminism in its lineage; it would certainly have been conditioned by a feminist past. But would
it be feminist? If we truly do embrace the future as open and ourselves as
women as historical existences, I don't think that question is answerable in
advance.
To conclude: I've said here that I believe, with Foucault, that philosophy
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is not a body of doctrine or even a set of analytical techniques. It is a way of
living, a pursuit that informs all our activities and is informed by all our activities. It has been called pursuit of wisdom-which means that it is a kind
of creative self-shaping, a kind of self-transformation that opens toward differing, toward the unmastered and the unknown. We normalized selves, fundamentally developmental and therefore perpetually transformative "in essence," are particularly well suited to take up philosophy and even to do so
both as a means of resisting oppressive normalizing technologies and as a
means of caring for and affirming ourselves. Construed in this way, as Foucauldian care of the self, can philosophy be feminist? Can feminism be philosophical? I hope so. But, in the end, whether feminism can be philosophical or philosophy can be feminist are not issues that can ever be settled on
paper. They can be resolved only in practice, by being enacted and incorporated. Therefore I must leave the question open here. It stands as a challenge to me and to all feminists and philosophers to make it so. That is, to
live it so.
NOTES

1. See, for example, the introduction to The Use ofPleasure where Foucault writes,
"I have benefited greatly from the works of Peter Brown and those of Pierre Hadot,
and I have been helped more than once by the conversations we have had and the
views they have expressed" (1985, 8).
2. Hadot was Foucault's colleague for one year at the College de France, having
taken the chair in the History of Hellenistic and Roman Thought in 1983.
3· This is a temptation that a lot of good thinkers succumb to; they write an extremely influential book or set of articles, and then they spend the rest of their lives
repackaging the same ideas in better and better ways. Not that there isn't value in
doing that, but it is primarily a literary, not a philosophical, activity.
4· See Embree (1970, 194-212) and Weisstein (1970, 228-45).
5· Echols (1989, 5). Echols maintains that there is a distinction of note between
radical feminism and cultural feminism, even though some of the same thinkers
are prominent in both. I'm less sure of her distinction, but whether it is conceptually sound or not, the point remains that the work of the 1960s and early 1970s
has a different thrust or at least is open to a different interpretation than the work
that came after it.
6. Beauvoir quotes several women's descriptions of their own extremely negative attitudes toward menstruation (1989, 310-14).
7· See, for example, Barry: "We must look to our matriarchal past for guidance
in defining a culture that is a logical extension of nature. With the essence of motherhood and a sense of the preservation of life imprinted in our genes, matrilineal
descent will naturally become the organization of the society we envision" (1973,
25). See also, for example, Daly (1984).
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8. Foucault (1980, 117): "I don't believe the problem can be solved by historicising the subject as posited by the phenomenologists, fabricating a subject that
evolves through the course of history. One has to dispense with the constituent
subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which
can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And
this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for
the constitution ofknowledges, discourses, domains of object etc., without having
to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field
of events runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history."
9. See, for example, Foucault's claim: "My objective, instead, has been to create
a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made
subjects" (1983, 208).
10. I have an unpublished paper on this subject entitled "Of or Pertaining to a
Female," which I presented as a keynote address at Vanderbilt University's Philosophy and Feminism conference in January 1999.
11. For a great deal more detail about this notion of a self-overcoming selfhood,
see McWhorter (1999, especially chapter 7).
12. Much as we might think of the space formed by the interplay of Dionysus
and Apollo in Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy.
13. This doesn't work in same-sex spaces where people are particularly insistent
upon a single image of their sex-like traditional baby showers or gyms where
everyone is young and beautiful. The gym at my university is a good place to go
because there are beautiful, slim, young women but also, since any employee can
use the facility for free, there are older women with weight problems, women with
injuries and disabilities, bull dykes with big muscles, and of course a number of
anorexics. To categorize all these bodies and comportments as one type of human
being, a type that overrides all other differences, seems ridiculous in that context.
The more time I spend in that context, the less overriding the category "woman"
comes to seem. I think Honi Haber is suggesting something like this tactic. See
Haber (1996, 137-56).
14. I take this path to be the one advocated by Judith Butler: "Identity categories
are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary. This
is not to say that the term 'woman' ought not to be used, or that we ought to announce the death of the category. On the contrary, if feminism presupposes that
'women' designates an undesignatable field of differences, one that cannot be totalized or summarized by a descriptive identity category, then the very term becomes a site of permanent openness and resignifiability.... To deconstruct the
subject of feminism is not, then, to censure its usage, but, on the contrary, to release the term into a future of multiple significations, to emancipate it from the
maternal or racialist ontologies to which it has been restricted, and to give it play
as a site where unanticipated meanings might come to bear" (1992, 15-16).
15. As Foucault says, everyiliing is dangerous, and postmodernism is no exception.
16. Even the personal changes I've described above required social and legal
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change. It really wasn't enough for me to rethink my female embodiedness. Laws
had to change to allow women to engage in activities previously unavailable or offlimits to us. Attitudes of people around me had to change to accommodate my
changes. There were communal forces at work in my feminist self-transformations,
and those must not be overlooked or minimized.
17. It is important, though, to acknowledge and contend with the various things
that woman is, to work through them and possibly at times to redeploy them strategically. We can't ignore the category. It does exist and have a very real place and
impact.
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